Since at least the mid-1990s, there has been a general consensus among economists that independent central banks rather than elected officials should conduct monetary policy to avoid political business cycles. As a result, a large majority of countries have now delegated monetary policymaking authority to central banks. At the same time, no such consensus exists on fundamental questions about how to organize these institutions.

There are currently very few opportunities for cross-field interactions to take place in the context of central bank design, which hinders progress on understanding the important issues. A key aim of the workshop is to bring together monetary policymaking staff from major central banks along with academic scholars from relevant fields to promote the sharing of ideas across areas of expertise.

Workshop organizers

Workshop program

 

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Previous editions

Speakers appear in the order in which they presented during the workshop.

2016 Edition
 
2015 Edition